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This paper addresses the formation of social norms of cooperation through interaction in 
repeated Public Goods Games, using novel multilevel techniques. Cooperation has 
traditionally been understood as the interplay of static factors such as shared social identity 
and pre-existing norms. This study investigates the dynamic emergence of cooperative norms 
in the presence or absence of social categorization. A small effect of categorization was 
found: Categorization helps initiate and maintain higher levels of cooperation. However, the 
differences in emergent cooperation between small groups were much stronger than the 
differences between the Categorization and Non-Categorization conditions. Using explorative 
analyses, three distinct classes of groups were found. Within groups, group members follow 
nearly identical rules for their choice of cooperative behavior. We argue that individual 
behavior converged because of the social interactions within these groups. Overall, the 
development of cooperation is best predicted by the process of norm formation that occurs 
when social identities emerge. 
Key words: social norms; cooperation; Public Goods Game; social identity; multilevel latent 
class Markov model 
 
  







How does cooperation in small groups emerge? This paper takes a dynamic 
perspective on the formation of social norms for cooperation. We also consider how social 
categorization can influence this norm formation. We seek to understand how cooperation 
arises and is maintained in a social dilemma: drawing on advances both in experimental 
software and in multilevel latent class Markov models, we can analyze decision rules for 
cooperation and the emergence of individual behavioral patterns in conjunction with group 
norms.  
The formation of cooperative norms in a small community, or society at large, has at 
least one fundamental hurdle: When there are collective goods – whether it be collective 
action, public television, farming collective lands, etc. (Katz, Lazer, Arrow, & Contractor, 
2004; Shankar & Pavitt, 2002) – there may be free riding because collective goods are shared 
equally, regardless of personal contribution (Samuelson, 1954). Therefore, traditional game 
theory argues that in order to maximize one’s (economic) self-interest, it is rational not to 
cooperate. For example, Hardin (1968) argued in the “Tragedy of the Commons” that 
everyone has an individual predisposition to take advantage of a common-pool resource, such 
as the environment, and therefore people are destined to undermine it – for example, through 
overgrazing or polluting. If this were true, all attempts at cooperation are ultimately doomed 
to fail or falter. 
Such social dilemmas are commonly studied in Public Goods Games (PGG) (Olson, 
1965). A PGG is essentially a simulated society in which participants decide how much to 
contribute to the Public Good – the socially optimal outcome is universal cooperation, the best 
individual outcome is defection while all others cooperate. Contrary to classic rational actor 
expectations, however, research suggests that cooperation in social dilemmas tends to be 





"irrationally" high: in the range of 40-60% of what one can contribute (for example, see 
Ledyard, 1995).   
Why is “rational defection” so rare in these experiments? In his seminal work on the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Robert Axelrod (1984) found that the most sustainable and profitable 
strategy in repeated interaction is tit-for-tat rather than self-interested defection. Tit-for-tat 
entails that people begin interaction by cooperating and then copy their interactant’s 
subsequent behavior – i.e., conditional cooperation. Tit-for-tat was seen as: a) nice, as it starts 
with cooperation; b) forgiving, as one will cooperate again when the other player stops 
defecting; c) retaliatory, as it punishes non-cooperation; and d) clear, as it is easy to discern 
the interaction pattern. Tit-for-tat was thought to be evolutionary robust and could emerge in 
an environment of egoist players, optimizing each player’s payoff. However, in reality one’s 
payoff is not necessarily instrumental (i.e., maximizing points) but might also have a  
relational value.  
Building on the ideas of game theory, the interdependence perspective (Kelley et al., 
2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2008; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) 
provides a framework to look at the effect of between-person processes on collective 
outcomes, where one’s optimal outcome has strong relational considerations. These 
considerations are determined by personal characteristics and situational factors. Whether 
exchanges are seen as rewarding or not, depends not only on instrumental payoff but also on 
one’s individually fixed preferences and expectations. Furthermore, interdependence theory 
assumes that an individual’s behavior will – to greater or lesser extent – be influenced by the 
actions of others, given a particular interdependence structure. Examples of these structures 
include situations in which an individual has unilateral control over another’s outcomes, or 
vice versa; or where both partners’ actions have an effect on outcomes for both. In other 
words, the situation structure influences an individual’s behavior in relation to those to whom 





one’s outcome is tied. If levels of "rational defection" are rare in PGG's, interdependence 
theory suggests this may be because certain individuals value good relations more than profit. 
However, one potential issue for interdependence theory is that most research in this tradition 
focuses on dyads, which is quite far removed from the more complex dynamics of groups. 
Nevertheless, Public Goods research has revealed many static factors that contribute to 
higher levels of cooperation. Of particular interest to social scientists are a shared social 
identity (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Simpson, 2006) and differences in preferences and 
beliefs (e.g., social value orientation, Messick & McClintock, 1968).  
Static views on Cooperation and Social Identity 
Much of the traditional research using PGGs examines cooperation in one-shot 
experiments. There is an extensive literature on situational and personal factors that influence 
decisions to cooperate or defect in such settings. We refer to these as “static” factors, in the 
sense that their effects are assumed independent of (or exogenous to) the social interactions or 
exchanges within the PGG. 
For example, cooperation tends to be high in groups that share a social identity. 
Shared social identities can be formed “deductively”, whereby group members infer a joint 
category membership because they exhibit shared characteristics or prototypical traits 
(Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Turner, 
1985). In other words, group identity can form from the top down. Belonging to a shared 
social category (gender, race, nationality etc.) or even “minimal” groups without meaning 
(Tajfel et al., 1971) can, for example, increase the sense of belonging and group cohesion 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and promote ingroup favoritism (Tajfel et 
al., 1971). 
Higher social identification with one’s group not only alters expectations about the 
behaviors of others: greater cooperation is mediated by one’s sense of self as a group member 





(De Cremer, Van Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & Van Leeuwen, 2008). Having a shared social 
identity appears to transform the goals of selfish individuals so that they cooperate rather than 
defect (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Turner, 1991). Accordingly, one can increase 
cooperation by categorizing people at the collective, rather than subgroup or individual level 
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Wit & Kerr, 2002; but see Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002, for 
exceptions). Group members, when they identify as a group and hence when shared identity is 
salient, tend to optimize ingroup outcomes and minimize ingroup inequalities (Simpson, 
2006), both of which happen when all group members contribute maximally to the Public 
Good.  
A large body of literature shows that levels of cooperation also depend on personal 
preferences. In interdependence theory, a personality difference that has received much 
attention is the distinction between those who are more individualistic, competitive and 
“proself” versus those who are more altruistic, cooperative and “prosocial” (social value 
orientation, SVO, Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999). This explains about 9% 
of the variation in cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009). 
Approaches to SVO tend to treat these preferences for cooperation or selfishness as fairly 
stable response styles (Messick, 1999). With respect to exchange decisions, these response 
styles may operate as social heuristics for behaviors that have become automated and intuitive 
because they were rewarding in the past (Jordan, Peysakhovich, & Rand, 2014) and therefore  
may spill over into novel situations (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). To our knowledge, how 
these personal response styles play out in dynamic settings, where individuals with different 
social heuristics interact for a prolonged series of exchanges, has not yet been explored.  
Above the individual level, the decision whether or not to cooperate can also be 
influenced by the overarching goal frame salient in a particular context (Lindenberg, 2015a, 
2015b), which also informs the social heuristics drawn on by the individual. Notably, 





Lindenberg (2015a, 2015b) draws a distinction between personal preferences and overarching 
goals, arguing that the latter are determined by the social environment. According to 
Lindenberg (2015a, 2015b), particular social situations activate certain goal frames to a 
greater extent than others (although others may still operate in the background). This explains 
why the social framing of cooperation dilemmas can have different outcomes for cooperative 
or competitive behavior (see for example Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; Van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). For example, framing a social dilemma in cooperative 
terms (“Community game”), versus competitive terms (“Wall Street game”), can increase 
cooperation by providing a normative goal frame (where collective gain is salient) versus a 
gains goal frame (where individual gain is salient). Beyond these situational goal frames, the 
level of within-game cooperation is also likely to be affected by the quality of interactions 
within the game. Here we might see the emergence of norms of an entirely different kind.  
Dynamic views on Cooperation and Social Identity  
The emergence of cooperation is increasingly being studied through iterative social 
dilemmas. Naturally, this shift in interest in the field focuses on how relations (or even 
societies) form that are more or less cooperative. This is highly relevant: variability in the 
levels of cooperation between societies tends to be high (e.g., Henrich et al., 2001), so it is 
important to understand what makes a society promote high levels of cooperation. As an 
overall trend, research suggests that cooperation is usually higher when there is a higher 
probability of interacting again in the future (Dal Bó, 2005), possibly due to the role of direct 
and indirect reciprocity where one expects present cooperative behavior to be returned in the 
future (Lindenberg, 2015b; Molm, Schaefer, & Collett, 2007). Factors that enhance the effect 
of reciprocity in cooperative situations include: homogeneity, smallness and stability of the 
group and its membership (Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2015). 





 Most findings from iterative PGGs show that contributions often start at around 50% 
of what one can possibly contribute and, although they tend to decline over time, the average 
contribution remains above zero (Barrera, 2014). Additional research considers factors 
preventing this tendency of decline. For example, studies have found that implementing a 
sanctioning system can mitigate a decline in cooperation (e.g., Barrera, 2014; van Miltenburg, 
Buskens, Barrera, & Raub, 2014). Sanctioning is a form of negative feedback in response to 
defection, which ideally discourages future defection and encourages cooperation. 
Sanctioning can occur in multiple ways, through material or symbolic means – for example, 
monetary penalties or the communication of social disapproval (Barrera, 2014; Van 
Miltenburg et al., 2014).  
Although cooperation can increase through learning and experience in some infinitely 
repeated games, this is not the case in all games (e.g., Dal Bó, 2005): the exact conditions that 
account for these group differences are not well understood. Therefore, it is valuable to study 
dynamic factors – rather than static factors only – that may increase cooperation. One of these 
is the effect of communication in cooperation dilemmas. Communication increases 
cooperation (Chen & Komorita, 1994; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977) presumably 
because it provides the ability to: 1) enhance understanding of the PG situation; 2) coordinate 
actions; 3) create cooperative social norms; 4) form strategic agreements; 5) enhance trust in 
others; and 6) establish a social identity (Chen, 1996; Shankar & Pavitt, 2002). 
Communication is thus interactive and can help people to coordinate and support higher levels 
of cooperation within groups.  
Another dynamic component is the in-game formation of either positive or negative 
social ties which depends on the nature of interaction with other players rather than 
exclusively on one’s pre-interaction social value orientation. For example, Van Dijk, 
Sonnemans and van Winden (2002) found direct evidence for social ties (i.e., the extent to 





which two people care about the well-being of one another) forming over time in interaction. 
Once positive social ties are formed, it seems likely that they would have implications for 
future cooperation.  
According to the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, & 
Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005), communication and the formation of social ties 
both play a role in the induction of a shared identity. Research suggests that social interaction, 
the formation of personal relations, and coordinated action can all contribute to the emergence 
of group bonds. In this process, social identity is formed inductively (from the bottom up), 
rather than just deductively (inferred top-down based on predefined social categories). This is 
naturally a more emergent view of social identification, consistent with arguments that the 
agency of an individual in the group can promote identification (Reicher & Haslam, 2013); 
and that interpersonal network interactions foster group belonging and well-being  
(Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013).  
One study has shown some evidence that cooperation may be higher in groups that 
have formed a shared identity through induction (Jans, Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2012), but 
only for heterogeneous rather than homogenous groups. The actual process of forming a 
shared identity during social exchange, and how this in turn influences cooperation over time, 
has not been studied as far as we know.  
In sum, while prior research has often explored static factors that influence 
cooperation (e.g. categorization, personal preferences, social heuristics, goal frames), more 
recently attention has turned to dynamic factors accounting for the emergence and 
maintenance of cooperation over time (e.g. induction, communication, social tie formation). 
There are many dynamic factors operating at the group and individual level that all seem to be 
heavily influenced by the social environment. One approach to further this line of research is 
to determine how these factors operate together and arise simultaneously.  






The present research 
How do within-game cooperative norms emerge over time in tandem with dynamic 
factors, such as the induction of a shared identity? We introduce some methodological 
advances – in terms of experimental design and software, as well as statistical techniques – 
that enable us to study the emergence of groups and cooperative norms within groups over 
time. The study presented here is an experimental Public Goods Game where social 
interaction over time was possible and where we manipulated the presence or absence of 
social categorization.  
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Psychology students (N=240, 164 female, 74 male, two undeclared, Mage= 20.32) 
participated in return for course credit. Groups of six interacted for 1.5 hours. There were 2 
conditions, Categorized versus Non- Categorized, with 20 groups each. For multilevel studies, 
power calculations requires approximate knowledge of not only effect sizes but also intraclass 
correlation coefficients and other parameters (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Given the novelty of 
the present research and thus not knowing which parameter values to expect, we had no 
reliable grounds for sample size calculations and decided to use what we expected would be a 
relatively high sample size at the experimental group level. The study was approved by the 
departmental Ethics Committee. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in this 
study. 
Procedure 
A Public Goods game with communication was created on the experimental platform, 
the Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL, see viappl.org). Participants came to the lab in 





groups of 6. They were connected through the server and all interaction took place over 
VIAPPL, whilst they were physically present in the same room with screens partitioning 
individual computers. The game had four stages: 1) dyadic exchange and group formation; 2) 
Public Goods Game; 3) group reformation and, finally, 4) a second PGG. Before the 
experiment, the general rules of the PGG were explained (via instruction manuals) and a brief 
demonstration of the software was given.  
To introduce dynamic interaction and to make the emergence of groups possible, 
participants were given the opportunity to build their own social psychological stimulus 
through interaction in the first stages of the experiment. A settler’s metaphor was used for 
this: participants were asked to imagine that they had arrived on a newly discovered island 
where they would settle and farm the land. They were informed that there are other new 
arrivals on this island with whom they could communicate, interact, and form “farming co-
operatives” in order to build their farms and start cultivating the land.  
Dyadic Exchange. In order for participants to form farming co-operatives (or co-ops), 
participants could interact with each other beforehand. After the background story was 
presented, participants began a dyadic exchange task where they exchanged building 
materials with other participants to build their farmhouse. Each participant possessed one 
unique building material and there were six in total. They were asked to accumulate three 
additional materials during the task. Participants could message one another in order to 
coordinate their exchanges1. 
                                                 
1 Since communication itself could not bind players to their choices, strategic patterns of behaviors 
had the potential to emerge – for example a player could promise to exchange with another player in 
order to get the second player’s resource but then not follow through in the action round. We are 
interested not in these strategic patterns themselves (and therefore do not analyze them here), but 
rather how participants could use this information in their interactions in order to form the co-ops in 
the following phase of the game. 





The outcome of dyadic exchange was symbolic as the ‘houses’ built had no carry-over 
into the following phases of the game. However, this task did provide participants with a 
history of interaction that could be a basis for forming co-ops. The feedback at the end of the 
task was identical for all participants – “Well done! You built your farm as best you could. 
Now organize - through discussion - which co-op you want to join!”. The message appeared 
regardless of how many materials the participant ended up with.  
Group formation. At this stage participants were given the opportunity to join one of 
three co-ops after communicating via instant messaging for 3 minutes2. The choice of three 
co-ops instead of two, reflects the idea that groups often exist in complex formations, not 
purely in dichotomous terms (Kerr, Durrheim, & Dixon, 2017). Furthermore, we felt that two 
groups would make the choice for the Categorized condition too obvious so we allowed room 
for participants to make alternate groups, not simply recreate the assigned categories/groups 
(although they could form two groups and leave the third co-op empty). The only rule was 
that each co-op could have a maximum of 4 members; the 5th person who tried to join would 
be asked to make a different selection.  
Public Goods Game. Two Public Goods Games were played. The first followed 
directly after group formation and lasted 10 rounds.3 The second game (12 rounds) was 
played after participants were allowed to reform co-ops (this time without making exchanges 
beforehand). Following general rules of PGGs (Olson, 1965), participants received an 
endowment of 10 tokens at the beginning of each round of the game. They then 
communicated for a short period of time (40 seconds) before individually deciding whether to 
contribute anything from 0 to 10 tokens to their co-op (they could not contribute to other co-
                                                 
2 Due to a limitation in the software at the time, participants had to indicate their choice twice. The 
second time they did so, the co-ops were set for the PGG. This was necessary to give participants who 
discovered they had not coordinated their selections well the opportunity to change their choices.  
3 To avoid end-game effects we did not inform the participants how many rounds there were in each 
PGG but rather told them that the computer would randomly determine the number. 





ops). Unallocated tokens were automatically added to one's ‘personal account’. At the end of 
each round, participants were paid out from their co-op; whereby the total funds in the co-op 
were multiplied by 1.2 and divided equally among the co-op members, regardless of how 
many tokens they had personally contributed. At the end of each round, each participant 
received an updated token balance: a 2 token increase per round + tokens not contributed to 
their co-op + their share of the co-op profit. The tokens had a symbolic value and did not 
relate to any payment at the end of the experiment but we encouraged participants to “Try to 
collect 45 tokens or more!”. 
This set up presents a classic social dilemma where the socially optimal outcome – 
where all co-op members benefit equally and the total is maximal – is obtained if all members 
invest their entire endowment in their co-op at every round. However, individuals could 
potentially earn more tokens if the others in their co-op made high contributions and they 
would defect by investing less or nothing. Participants were provided with payoff examples in 
the instruction manual (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Examples of payoff calculations given to participants 
 
Example 1: 
You are in a co-op with 3 people. You start with 10 tokens. You decide to invest 8 in your co-op. The 
other co-op members invest 8 and 8 respectively.  
The share that everyone gets would be: ((8 + 8 + 8) x 1.2)/3 = 9.6 
It’s pay-out time! You get:  
2 + 2 + 9.6 = 13.6 (14) and so do the others 
 
Example 2: 
You are in a co-op with 4 people. You start with 10 tokens. You decide to invest 5 in your co-op. The 
other co-op members invest 2, 5 and 8 respectively.  
The share that everyone gets would be: ((5+2+ 5+8) x 1.2)/4 = 6 
It’s pay-out time! You get:  
2 + 5 + 6 = 13 
The others get 16, 13 and 10 respectively.  
 





Participants were able to see how many tokens each other participant contributed to 
their co-op in the previous round. This was presented through a visual summary image at the 
end of each round (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Note: The avatar with the darker outline around it represented the individual player onscreen.  
Figure 2. Visual Summary Image taken from one Experimental group in the Categorized 
condition.  
 
In addition, the other participants' token balance was visible during the entire game. 
Participants could also see the amounts contributed in other co-ops.  
Post-experimental Questionnaire. This was administered after completion of the 
second PGG. The questions referred to the second co-op that a participant had joined. We did 
not ask questions about the first co-ops to avoid priming effects in the second PGG.  
Experimental manipulation. There were two experimental conditions: Categorized 
and Non-Categorized. In the Categorized condition, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two groups – the Purple or Green group – at the beginning of the experiment. Each 





group was asked to imagine that they had arrived on the island as a group, on the same ship. 
The metaphor of common ships was meant to provide an abstract and minimal social category 
from which participants could deduce who should be in their co-ops. Group homogeneity was 
made salient by coloring the avatars, representing participants onscreen, purple or green. In 
minimal group studies such categorizations promote in-group bias (Tajfel et al., 1971). We 
expected categorization to influence the choice of co-op as well as subsequent cooperative 
behavior. In line with the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et 
al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005), this is a process in which group identity is deduced 
from a shared “history” of the group, group homogeneity and/or the presence of a distinct 
outgroup. 
In the Non-Categorized condition, participants imagined that each had individually 
arrived on a different ship from a unique land. Individual heterogeneity was made salient by 
using uniquely colored avatars. By not providing a pre-assigned category, we reasoned that 
any groups that formed could only be “induced”– that is, formed only based on 
communication in the dyadic exchange stage. We assumed that the Non-Categorized 
condition offered more scope for an inductive group formation process in which personal 
value to the group may be acknowledged (here, through individual heterogeneity) and the co-
ops are formed through interpersonal interaction. In addition, there is no distinct outgroup 
from the beginning of the manipulation, unlike in the Categorized condition. 
In both conditions, participants were free to choose to form any co-ops they wished.  
Dependent variables 
Co-op formation and change. This DV was measured by an individual’s choice of co-
op membership, before the first and second PGG respectively. With it we could test 1) whether 
individuals in the Categorized condition were more likely to form a co-op with their categorical 





group (Green or Purple) and 2) the degree of change in co-op membership between PGGs (for 
both conditions).  
Cooperation/Amount contributed to the PG. The behavioral data from both PGGs 
represented the degree of cooperation with one’s co-op. This was operationalized by the number 
of tokens contributed to the co-op at each round (an integer from 0 to 10).  
 Social Psychological Measures. To better understand why participants cooperated or 
not, we included several variables which are of theoretical interest and which could be linked 
to the behavioral data. Items were measured on a 7 point Likert scale from 1 = “strongly 
disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”. The primary constructs we measured were: social 
identification (e.g., “During the game, I identified with other members of my co-operative”; 
adapted from Leach et al., 2008; 6 items, =0.82); belongingness (e.g., “During the game I 
felt connected with one or more members in my co-operative”; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; 
4 items, =0.86) and the entitativity of the co-op (e.g., "This co-operative acted as a unit"; 
Brooke, Postmes, Jetten, & Dyson, 2009; Jans, Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2011; 4 items; 
=0.89). We also measured perceived trust (e.g., “I trusted that other members of my co-
operative would follow through on what they said in their messages”; 2 items, =0.75) and 
satisfaction with the co-op (e.g., “I wanted to exit my co-operative”, reverse scored; 4 items, 
=0.85). To avoid interrupting the game or priming participants, these were all measured after 
the second PGG and thus referred to the second co-op only.  
In addition, identification with (4 items, =0.84) and perceived entitativity of (4 items, 
=0.90) the entire group of participants was measured because a game-like experience could 
bond all participants, regardless of co-op membership. By including these measures we could 
distinguish ‘game feelings’ from feelings toward the co-op, which we were interested in. 
Items for game social identification include, for example: “I identified with all the other 





participants in the game”; and for game entitativity: “All the participants of this game were in 
agreement on how to behave”. Social identification with, and perceived entitativity of the co-
op were only slightly correlated with the game experience (r = 0.30 and 0.36 respectively). 
This weak correlation rules out the possibility that bonding within the game as a whole could 
account for effects within co-ops. Game identification and entitativity are not used in further 
analysis.  
Finally to tap into inductive identity we measured personal value to the group (e.g., 
“My co-op could not have functioned without me”; adapted from Koudenburg, Postmes, 
Gordijn, & Van Mourik Broekman, 2015); however, the scale had low reliability (3 items, 
=0.55) and was not used in the analysis. We also measured ingroup bias towards the other 
co-ops in the game but the low reliability (3 items, =0.57) also excluded this measure from 
further analysis. The descriptive statistics for each measure can be found in Table A1 in the 
Supplementary Information. 
Discussion content. In this paper, we do not analyze the content of the messages as it 
is beyond the scope of this article and will be the subject of future work. However, we would 
like to provide some relevant descriptive information. Messages were no longer than 100 
characters, although an unlimited number of messages could be sent between contribution 
rounds. Across the two PGGs, 224 out of 240 participants sent at least one message to their 
co-op. Across the 224, the mean number of messages sent was 15.3 and 12.3 in the first and 
second PGG, respectively. The mean number of characters per message was 21 and 24, with a 
maximum of 48 and 37 messages sent per PGG. There were no differences in the quantity of 
communication between conditions.  
Hypotheses  
Hypothesis 1. For the Categorized condition, participants on the same “ship” 
(representing a social category) have a higher probability of being in the same co-op, 





compared to random selection. Since no one in the Non-Categorized condition shared a ship, 
this condition is not a suitable comparison and so we test this hypothesis through simulations 
for the Categorized condition. Of course, if this hypothesis is supported, this logically implies 
differences between experimental conditions. 
 Hypothesis 2.  At the end of the cooperation, co-ops in the Categorized and Non-
Categorized condition will have similar levels of social identification, entitativity, 
belongingness etc. This expectation is based on the theory that shared identities and solidarity 
emerge through cooperative interactions, even in the absence of a priori social categorizations 
(Jans et al., 2012; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005). Note that this research hypothesis of “no 
difference” is a statistical null hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3. On average, contributions to the co-op will be higher in the Categorized 
compared to the Non-Categorized condition. Differences between conditions will be stronger 
in earlier phases of the game. Cooperation within co-ops in the Non-Categorized condition is 
expected to emerge over time, in line with Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation 
(Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005) (see Figure 3). 
 





Figure 3. Expected Levels of Cooperation over time   
 
Analysis Approach and Results 
Co-op formation and change: Hypothesis 1 
Method.  Were participants in the Categorized condition more likely to form co-ops 
with their category (Green or Purple group)? We tested independence between pre-assigned 
categories and co-ops in this condition to find out.  
We calculated the Jaccard similarity coefficient4 between the adjacency matrices for 
belonging to the same category and belonging to the same co-op (Batagelj & Bren, 1995; 
Jaccard, 1900). A coefficient of 1 indicates complete overlap (i.e., social categories are identical 
to co-ops), while 0 indicates that every pair in the same social category is in different co-ops. 
The null hypothesis was tested by a permutation test, comparing the observed Jaccard 
coefficient with the distribution of Jaccard coefficients between the observed co-ops and 
randomly chosen, equally sized groups5. If the observed Jaccard value is significantly high in 
this comparison, this is a sign that individuals were more likely to join a co-op with their own 
category members rather than with other category members.  
Stability of the co-ops (in both conditions) over the course of the experiment was also 
tested. Participants selected co-ops before the first PGG and before the second PGG, therefore 
co-op membership could change. Stability was likewise measured by Jaccard’s similarity index 
and a permutation test, described above6. Higher Jaccard indices for co-op change over time 
                                                 
4 This coefficient is defined as the proportion of the pairs that are linked in both categories and co-ops, 
among the pairs that are linked in at least one of these. 
5 Note that the Green and Purple groups also were of equal size 
6 For the complete results, see Supplementary material, which includes the coordination of group 
formation 





indicate that co-op members tended to stick together, while indices of 0 mean that co-ops 
changed completely.  
Results. First, we tested whether in the Categorized condition, participants in the same 
pre-assigned categorical group are more likely to be in the same co-op. The results from the 
permutation test showed that participants were more likely to form co-ops with their 
categorical group members compared to random choice, in both Co-op Formation phases (p < 
0.001 for both, see Table 1). Therefore Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 
Table 1 
Co-op Selection: Categorized condition 
Co-op Formation Phase Random mean Jaccard (with s.e.) Observed mean Jaccard 
First PGG 0.27 (0.04) 0.53  
Second PGG 0.28 (0.05) 0.56  
 
As an illustration: if, for example, in the Categorized condition the first co-op is 
formed by all members of one category and one member of the other category, and the second 
co-op by the remaining two members of the second category, then J=4/9=0.44. Note that the 
proportions of games in which categories were exactly the same as co-ops were 0.10 and 0.15, 
for the first and second PGG respectively. 
Next, we tested the degree of change in co-ops between PGGs for both conditions.  
 
Table 2  
Co-op change between PGGs: Both conditions 
Condition Random mean Jaccard (with s.e.) Observed mean Jaccard 
Categorized 0.28 (0.04) 0.56  







As shown in Table 2, the observed mean Jaccard coefficients were around 0.5 for both 
conditions – meaning that about 50-60% of the pairs stayed together.  The results of the 
permutation tests for both conditions were significant (p<0.001), indicating significant 
similarity in co-op membership between the two PGGs. 
Social Psychological Effects: Hypothesis 2 
Method. To test for differences between the Categorized and Non-Categorized 
condition in the measured social psychological variables, we ran a multilevel, multivariate 
model (Snijders & Bosker, 2012) using runMlwin in R (Version 2.36) (Leckie & Charlton, 
2013; Rasbash, Charlton, Browne, Healy, & Cameron, 2009). We examined the effect of 
experimental condition (Categorized vs. Non-Categorized) on several dependent variables: 
social identification, belonging, entitativity, trust and satisfaction with the co-op. Correlations 
are reported in Table A2 of the Supplementary Information. 
This model takes into account the dependencies between measured variables (i.e. 
responses, Level 1), as well as possible similarities among participants (Level 2) in the same 
co-op (Level 3). Co-ops from the second PGG define the nesting level at Level 3. Adding a 
fourth level (i.e., experimental group) caused convergence issues and was dropped from the 
final model.  
Results. We had not expected notable differences between conditions and the results 
largely support this expectation (Hypothesis 2). Comparing the null model to the model with 
the experimental condition, showed the multivariate test was significant (2(5) = 13.9, 
p=0.02), therefore the univariate results are considered. However, there were no significant 
univariate differences at all. There were no significant differences between conditions for 
social identification (= -0.250, SD= 0.197, z = -1.27, 95% CI (-0.637, 0.136), p=0.20), 
Non-Categorized 0.25 (0.04) 0.54  





entitativity (= -0.133, SD= 0.219, z = -0.60, 95% CI (-0.564, 0.299), p=0.55), trust (= -
0.217, SD= 0.191, z = -1.14, 95% CI (-0.592, 0.157), p=0.25), satisfaction with the co-op (= 
0.002, SD= 0.222, z = 0.01, 95% CI (-0.432, 0.0437), p=0.99) or sense of belonging to the co-
op (= -0.323, SD= 0.181, z = -1.79, 95% CI (-0.7677, 0.031), p=0.07). The null findings 
make the multivariate significance difficult to interpret.   
 
The Effect of Categorization versus Non-Categorization on Cooperative behavior: 
Hypothesis 3. 
Method. Changes in the level of cooperation – as inferred from the amount 
contributed to the co-op at each round – was analyzed by two different methods. First, we 
present longitudinal multilevel models, followed by a more detailed analysis using a dynamic 
latent class model. The former method is more traditional and easier to grasp, giving 
important descriptive insights. However, it also revealed that model assumptions of 
heteroscedasticity were not met; therefore, it cannot conclusively test hypotheses. We do 
present model-based standard errors here to give readers an indication of the uncertainty in 
the estimates. The second analysis gives more fine-grained results. 
First, we tested a longitudinal, polynomial multilevel model (Snijders & Bosker, 2012) 
in which rounds/time (Level 1) is nested in participants (Level 2), in co-ops (Level 3), in 
experimental groups (Level 4). Splines – i.e., functions that allows for the pattern of growth to 
change direction or speed at specified points – improved model fit (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
Analyses were conducted using the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) 
in R (R Core Team, 2016). Data from the first and second PGG were modelled separately 
since co-op membership (and therefore the nesting structure) could change from the first to 
the second PGG.  We base our reported model on model-building criteria and did not use 
hypothesis testing. The assumption of homoscedasticity of the residual variance is not tenable 





for this dataset as many people repeated their behavior from round to round. Nevertheless, 
this model gives good descriptive insights.  
Results.  
Cooperation in the First PGG. We investigated the difference in cooperation over 
time between the two conditions. The intra-class correlation showed that 37% of the 
unexplained variation in cooperation lies at the co-op level; 59% at the round level; only 4% 
lies at the experimental group level and 0% at the individual level. The best fitting model was 
a quadratic model with a spline function7 and random slopes for round at the co-op level. 
Details can be found in Table A3 in the Supplementary Information. 
Results suggest a negative effect of condition on cooperation ( = -0.77, SE = 0.42) with 
slightly higher cooperation in the Categorized compared to the Non-Categorized condition. 
There was also a negative interaction between round and condition ( = -0.10, SE = 0.06). The 
corresponding curves of model predictions for both conditions over time are shown in Figure 
4: Cooperation increases over time in both conditions until round 4, after which cooperation in 
the Categorized condition continues to increase slightly whereas cooperation in the Non-
Categorized condition declines slightly. Higher overall cooperation in the Categorized 
condition is in line with Hypothesis 3, however the time pattern is not (see Figure 3) since 
cooperation in the Non-Categorized condition declined after round 4. As seen in Figure 5, most 
of the variation occurred between individual co-ops, much more so than between conditions.   
 
                                                 
7 The spline has a node at round 4. This means that the function is quadratic for rounds up to 4, as well 
as quadratic from round 4 onward, and smooth, but the coefficient for the squared term changes value 
at round 4. 























































Condition: ● ●Categorized Non−Categorized
Categorized Non−Categor ized



































Cooperation in the Second PGG. For the interested reader, and to avoid too much 
repetition, full results for the second PGG can be found in the Supplementary Information. 
The overall pattern of results was similar: overall cooperation was slightly higher in the 
Categorized compared to the Non-Categorized condition, although in both conditions 
cooperation started higher and dipped slightly toward the end.   
In summary, overall cooperation was rather high in both conditions, and the condition 
did not have a strong effect on cooperation. Descriptively, there were higher levels of 
cooperation in the Categorized compared to the Non-Categorized condition, in both PGGs. 
This is in line with Hypothesis 3. However, the variance components and the plots suggest 
much variability between co-ops in the degree to which cooperation emerged. This variability 
is further investigated after the interim discussion. 
 
Interim Discussion: The Role of Categorization on Cooperation  
The discussion of this paper is in two parts. In this section, co-op formation and the role of 
categorization on overall cooperation are discussed. In the next section, we elaborate on the 
results from the second half of our analyses and make concluding remarks.   
First, in reference to the co-ops formed in the Categorization condition, we found that 
participants mostly self-selected their co-ops along category lines. While nothing in the 
experimental set-up forbade participants from forming any co-op they liked, perhaps with 
minimal information in a novel setting, they did what they thought was expected by the 
experimenter. However, the dyadic exchange rounds with communication before the PGG did 
provide interaction with all other participants (not just categorical group members). In 
addition, participants could join one of three co-ops, instead of two – designed to reduce the 
perceived demand that participants should form co-ops along category lines (20% of the time, 
three co-ops were formed). Although some co-ops formed exactly according to their pre-





assigned categories (12.5% of the time), most did not. Therefore, the formation of groups was 
likely a considered choice on the part of participants, although not purely cued by 
categorization. Nevertheless, since categorization did significantly impact co-op selection, 
this implies a logical difference between experimental conditions, although perhaps not very 
strong.  
 Following group formation, cooperation in the first PGG was high in both conditions – 
even higher than the usual 40-60% of cooperation found in most public goods research 
(Ledyard, 1995). High levels of cooperation were probably due to the framing of the 
experiment – as building a community of farmers, after arriving on a deserted island –, 
repeated interaction, and the ability to communicate (allowing organisation, pledging, 
sanctioning, etc.).  
In the Categorized condition, we see that overall, there are slightly higher levels of 
cooperation that increase over time. Deductive groups, formed in a top-down manner by 
emphasizing category similarity (here via shared avatar color and background story), may 
have an easier time cooperating at higher levels from the beginning of interaction, thus 
cooperation has a stronger basis for growing over time, with little indication of decline. We 
initially expected that cooperation in categorized groups, starting at a higher level, would 
eventually decline as time went on (see Figure 3) but found that categorization seems to 
prevent decline, in the first PGG at least. This suggests that for sustainable cooperation, 
having a group categorization could be beneficial. 
In the Non-Categorized condition, although cooperation is still relatively high, and 
increases for a time, the trend toward the end of the interaction in the first PGG is downward. 
We expected that once non-categorized groups were given time to interact, cooperation would 
increase steadily rather than decrease. Previous research has shown that inductively formed 
groups – in which heterogeneity is salient and personal value highlighted – 





show equally high levels of social identification and solidarity as deductive groups, even 
though the pathway to identification and solidarity may be different (Jans et al., 2012; 
Koudenburg et al., 2015; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005). However, by looking closely at the 
between-group variation of cooperation at the co-op level, we see that while some co-ops in 
the Non-Categorized condition did continuously increase in cooperation over time, there was 
a set of others that did not, and there appears to be more variation between co-ops in this 
condition compared to the Categorized condition. Thus cooperation appears to depend more 
strongly on within-group processes in the Non-Categorized than in the Categorized condition. 
Perhaps inductive groups have a harder time maintaining cooperation compared to groups 
with a shared social category, but this largely depends on how the inductive group processes 
unfold.  
 Finally, in both conditions, there was little change in co-op membership between the 
first and second PGG – which makes sense considering the high levels of cooperation. 
Evidently, there is no need to leave a co-op that is collaborating well together. Furthermore, 
the slight decrease in cooperation in the Non-Categorized condition, toward the end of the 
first PGG, was not stark enough for participants to change co-ops more compared to the 
Categorized condition, suggesting that cooperation can still reach high levels in inductive 
groups. Related to this finding, there were no ultimate differences in one’s sense of 
identification, group belonging and entitativity between experimental conditions at the end of 
interaction (i.e., end of the second PGG). This supports the Interactive Model of Social 
Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005) which posits 
that inductively formed groups can develop the same social psychological outcomes as 
deductively formed groups, although the pathway may be different.  
The multilevel growth model, reported above and discussed here, provides a good 
description of how cooperation develops in the Categorized and Non-Categorized conditions. 





But for the purpose of testing hypotheses, it is not reliable because our data violated the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. Specifically, a sizeable proportion of individuals gave the 
same contribution round after round (i.e., repetition) while others hit the ceiling of 
cooperation; and this tended to be a shared behavior in some co-ops. These “zero variance” 
behaviors are a meaningful feature of the kinds of cooperative behaviors we are seeking to 
describe; but having a high proportion of them is extremely unlikely under the assumptions of 
the multilevel model. Therefore, the standard errors of these results cannot be trusted entirely. 
More importantly, our analysis revealed a considerable amount of between-co-op variability 
in cooperation within conditions that could not be well represented by a standard longitudinal 
multilevel model. To address these issues, we present the results of a more statistically 
complex model below. This model allows us to classify similar kinds of decision rules; 
individuals; and co-ops, regardless of the experimental conditions and comprises a more fine-
grained exploratory approach to analyzing these data. 
 
Classifying Cooperative behavior, types of individuals, and types of co-ops 
Method 
 The second analysis of amount contributed to the Pubic Good over time regards these 
amounts as resulting from a process of decisions made by participants. Technically, we use 
multilevel latent class Markov models (Lukočiene, Varriale, & Vermunt, 2010; Paas, 
Vermunt, & Bijmolt, 2007; Van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990; Vermunt, Tran, & Magidson, 
2008) implemented in Latent Gold (Version 5.1) (Vermunt & Magidson, 2016).  
In the model specified, decisions about the contributions are represented as regression 
models, operating round by round, where the amount contributed is the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variables are the participant’s own contribution in the previous round and 
the mean contribution of the participant’s co-op in the previous round. It is assumed that 





participants’ decision rules can be classified in a few types (“latent classes”), and each type 
embodies one decision rule, defined by the regression coefficients and the residual variance in 
the regression model. The type of decision rule followed by any given participant may change 
over time. Because of the experimental design, the model has three levels of latent classes, as 
follows. 
1. The first level is round, with a regression model for the amount contributed. The 
explanatory variables are the lagged contributions of self and co-op, and a dummy for 
the first round, necessary because then there are no lagged contributions. The 
parameters of this regression model embody the decision rule about cooperative 
behavior and are selected from K1 latent classes. These classes are dynamic, meaning 
that they can change from round to round. 
2. The second level is the individual, which is also in a latent class selected from K2 
latent classes of individuals. These are constant over time. The latent class of the 
individual probabilistically determines the latent classes at the round level. 
3. The third level is the co-op, in a latent class selected from K3 latent classes of co-ops, 
likewise constant over time. The latent class of the co-op probabilistically determines 
the latent classes of the individual. 
To specify the dynamic classes at Level 1, we need initial probabilities and the transition 
probability matrix specifying the probabilities phk that in round t+1 the class is k, given that in 
round t it was h. These initial probabilities and transition matrices depend on the latent class 
of the individual and are estimated from the data. 
The numbers of latent classes K1, K2, and K3 at the three levels are determined by a 
combination of goodness of fit and interpretability. Results of the estimation then include the 
set of decision rules employed (latent classes of regression models), the estimated class of 
each individual (determining the decision rules they generally employ), and the estimated 





class of the co-ops (determining their composition of classes of individuals). For a more 
technical treatment of the method, the interested reader is referred to the Supplementary 
Information where we provide more detailed background to the latent class Markov model, 
provide model specifications, further discuss our predictors and covariates for the model, as 
well as outline the process of model development.  
Results 
 Separate models were applied to the first PGG and the second PGG data as the nesting 
factor (i.e., co-op) could be different between games. We selected labels to describe the classes 
at each level, to aid with interpretation.   
Cooperation in the First PGG. The estimated model (see Supplementary Information 
for model building details) specified 4 classes of decision rules (Level 1) that participants 
drew on to decide how much to cooperate in a given round. Furthermore, individual 
participants could be classified into three classes (Level 2) which overlapped almost perfectly 
with three classes of co-ops (Level 3).  
Level 1: Decision rules for cooperation. We labelled the four decision rules as: 
Maximum Cooperation (the ceiling of cooperation), Nearly-There (close to Maximum 
Cooperation), Repetition (repeating one’s behavior from the previous round) and Reaction 
(responding to the contributions of the co-op), named in accordance with the interpretation 
below. Table 3 presents for each decision rule the overall relative frequency with which it is 
applied, the mean amount that resulted from its application, and the parameters of its linear 
regression model. The history of the game was found to be an important predictor in the 
decision regarding how much to cooperate with one’s co-op. Both own lagged amount and the 
lagged amount of the co-op can significantly distinguish among decision rules (own lag: 2 
(3) = 88820.06, p < 0.001; co-op lag: 2 (3) = 126.11, p <0.001). The four decision rules are 
significantly different from one another for the first round of the game, predicting different 





levels of cooperation from the outset (2 (3) = 16.02, p = 0.001). The four transition 
probability matrices are also significantly different (2 (12) = 153.28, p < 0.001). The 




 Decision Rules: Regression Results for First PGG 
 Maximum 
Cooperation 
Nearly-There Repetition Reaction 
Overall relative frequency 56% 8% 11% 26% 
Mean Amount 10 8.23 6.89 4.95 
Intercept 10 6.740 0 3.093 
First Round8 0 0.224 0 -0.791 
Lagged amount (own) 0 0.017 1 -0.364 
Lagged amount (co-op) 0 0.185 0 0.631 
Residual variance 0.001 0.239 0.007 4.914 
Note: The numbers reported in rows 3-6 are regression coefficients 
 
Table 4 





Nearly-There Repetition Reaction 
                                                 
8 The dummy for time was a binary variable 1 at the first round and 0 for all other rounds. The results 
of the dummy are not discussed here. 






















0.86 0.05 0.00 0.09 
Nearly there 0.59 0.07 0.22 0.12 
Repetition 0.19 0.18 0.28 0.35 
Reaction 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.58 
Note: The numbers presented in the table are the probabilities of each decision rule transitioning into 
each of the other decision rules in the following round. Row sums are 1.000, because these are the 
total probabilities of the previous decision rule transitioning into anything. 
 
The first decision rule, Maximum Cooperation, was the most common, guiding 
participant decisions on how much to cooperate 56% of the time. If someone applied this 
decision rule they would contribute the full endowment of 10 tokens to the PG. Due to this 
ceiling effect, the amount to contribute when using this decision rule could not be predicted 
by the history of the game (b = 0, for both own lag and co-op lag, Table 3) and the residual 
variation is almost nil (2 = 0.001), meaning that the rule – when used – was almost 
deterministic. In terms of stability, Maximum Cooperation was likely to remain the 
participant’s decision rule in the following round, with an 86% probability (see Table 4). 
The second most common decision rule, occurring 26% of the time, was Reaction 
(Mamount = 4.95). To give some insight into the coefficients, the regression model can be 
roughly approximated, for rounds 2 and further, by (1/3)*7 + (1/3)*self-lagged + 
(1/3)*(2*(co-op-lagged – self-lagged)). Interpreting this, the value of 7 and the own previous 
contribution may be regarded as providing reference values, and the third contribution is a 
reward for the co-op or a punishment – as the case may be – for the deviation between the 
contributions of co-op and self. If, in the previous round, the co-op average was higher than 
own contribution, it is a reward – the new amount contributed is higher than the reference 





value. If the co-op average was lower, then punishment follows – the new amount contributed 
is less than the reference value. In this decision rule the residual variation was highest (2 = 
4.91, Table 3). Reaction was more likely to remain the decision rule in the following round 
(58%) rather than transitioning to other decision rules, although it was less stable than 
Maximum Cooperation (see Table 4).  
Although not part of the definition of this decision rule, it is interesting to see 
descriptively in which situations it was applied. The frequency of applying Reaction was a 
decreasing function of the previous average contribution by the co-op, decreasing from about 
64% for low contributions (0-5 tokens) to 3% for very high contributions (10 tokens). 
Participants were more likely to be reactive to contributions by fellow co-op members, and 
base their behavior on a comparison between own and others’ contributions, in stages where 
the contributions by others were relatively low.  
Repetition (Mamount=6.89) occurred 11% of the time. This decision rule consisted of 
repeating what one did in the previous round9 (own lagged amount: b = 1.00, Table 3). 
Residual variance in this rule was low (2 = 0.007). From the transition probabilities in Table 
4, it appears that Repetition was the most unstable decision rule, with no clear pattern for 
transitioning to one of the other rules. 
The least frequent decision rule was Nearly-There (Mamount = 8.23), occurring 8% of 
the time. The contribution was quite high on average, with some variation explained mostly 
by the average co-op contribution in the previous round (b = 0.185, Table 3) and very slightly 
by one’s own previous contribution (b = 0.017). Residual variance was still rather low (2 = 
0.24). The label was chosen in view of the high probability of an individual switching to 
Maximum Cooperation in the next round (60% of the time, Table 4).  
                                                 
9 Notably, Repetition is higher in the first round of Figure 6, and in this case it means a contribution of 5. 
 






Figure 6. Proportion of individuals using each decision rule at each round: First PGG 
 
Figure 6 above visualizes the tendency for Maximum Cooperation to increase over 
time, while Reaction decreases.  
Level 2: Individual classes. Based on the four decision rules of behavior, the model 
distinguished among three classes of participants, which we labeled: Committed Cooperators 
(Mamount=9.19, 47% of participants), Responsive Players (Mamount=8.05, 36%) and Reactive 
Players (Mamount=5.99; 17%). It will become clear below that we interpret these classes as 
mainly emerging from group processes: we can rule out that a priori individual differences are 
involved.  
The strongest difference between the three classes are in the probability matrices of 
transitioning from one to another decision rule (2 (24) = 184.89, p < 0.001). There were less 
strong differences guiding the decision rule at the start of the game (2 (6) = 13.51, p = 0.04). 
The probability matrices for initial decision rules and transition probabilities per individual 
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Throughout the game, Committed Cooperators were much more likely to choose 
Maximum Cooperation over other decision rules, with a 79% probability. However, in the 
first round of the game (Table 5), they had a relatively low chance of using it (25%). This 
suggests that Committed Cooperators did not necessarily start off by contributing the highest 
amount, rather their cooperation developed over time. Furthermore, once they chose 
Maximum Cooperation, these players had a 97% chance of continuing with it in the 
subsequent round.  
Responsive Players drew on all decision rules but were most likely to be guided by 
Maximum Cooperation (49%) and Reaction (27%) during the game. In the first round, they 
had a 16% and 26% chance of choosing Maximum Cooperation and Reaction respectively 
(see Table 5). In comparison to Committed Cooperators, Responsive Players had a lower 
probability of sticking to Maximum Cooperation once they begun to use it (69% compared to 
97%).  
Finally, Reactive Players were most likely to choose Reaction (66%) and Repetition 
(21%) throughout the game, and they were the least likely class to select Maximum 
Cooperation (6%).  In addition, they tended to begin the game with the lowest amount of 
cooperation – with a 63% chance of choosing Reaction10 and zero probability of choosing 
Maximum Cooperation. In the unlikely case that Reactive Players chose Maximum 
Cooperation in one round, they only had a 6% chance of continuing to use it in the following 
round. 
 
Table 5  
Transition probabilities for Individual Classes in First PGG 
                                                 
10 Of course, in the first round, participants are not reacting to anything. However Reaction is labelled 
as such according to its general pattern.  






Starting Decision rule 
 






Committed 0.26 0.13 0.29 0.32 
 
Responsive 0.16 0.19 0.38 0.26 
 
Reactive 0.00 0.07 0.29 0.64 
 
     
  




















0.97 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Nearly-There 0.68 0.04 0.25 0.03 
Repetition 0.31 0.21 0.06 0.42 











0.69 0.09 0.00 0.21 
Nearly-There 0.62 0.01 0.21 0.15 
Repetition 0.26 0.19 0.33 0.22 








0.06 0.00 0.00 0.94 
Nearly-There 0.14 0.39 0.18 0.29 
Repetition 0.02 0.14 0.36 0.48 





Reaction 0.09 0.00 0.18 0.73 
 
 
Level 3: Co-op classes. A total of 86 co-ops formed in the first PGG, across the 
experimental groups. The model categorized these co-ops into three classes. Strikingly, the 
three co-op classes strongly overlap with the three individual classes (99.3 -99.6%). This 
means that the probabilities of the decision rules for cooperative behavior were: 1) consistent 
among all individuals within co-ops and 2) different between co-ops. This high 
correspondence of co-op and individual classes is best explained by the formation of within-
co-op social norms, which we will come back to in the discussion.  
The three co-op classes were labelled: Committed Co-ops (Mamount=9.19), Responsive 
Co-ops (Mamount=8.04) and Reactive Co-ops (Mamount=6.01); see Figure 7 for their trajectories 
of amounts contributed over time.  
 
 
Figure 7. The average amount contributed to the co-op over time: First PGG  






In a final model, the experimental condition (Categorized versus Non-Categorized) 
was included as a covariate at the co-op level to determine whether it affected the type of co-
op formed in the PGG. However, the overall main effect of condition was only marginally 
significant (2 (2) = 4.88, p = 0.09). For interest, exploration of the paired comparisons 
suggests that categorization can perhaps, to a small extent, predict the difference between the 
presence of Committed and Reactive Co-ops between conditions (2 (1) = 4.22, p = 0.04). 
There were more Committed Co-ops in the Categorized condition (55% versus 32%) and 
more Reactive Co-ops in the Non-Categorized condition (24% versus 10%).  
Cooperation in the Second PGG. The results from the second PGG were very 
similar to the first. We found the same four decision rules, three individual classes and three 
co-op classes, as well as the same overlap between individual and co-op classes. To avoid 
repetition, full results are in the Supplementary Information. To summarize these findings: 
The same classifications were found in the second PGG, but the overall level of cooperation 
was higher. Specifically: 1) the mean amounts contributed, predicted by the decision rules, 
were higher; 2) there was a higher proportion of individuals using Maximum Cooperation in 
each individual class; 3) more individuals could now be classified as Committed Cooperators 
and 4) more co-ops could be classified as Committed Co-ops. Therefore, these findings 
suggest that cooperation is learned and transferred from the first PGG into the second. 
Cooperative behavior seems to spill over from one stage of the experiment to the next and 
interestingly, the type of cooperator one is classified as at one time, can change – since there 
was a higher proportion of Committed Cooperators (13% more) in the second PGG, even 
though the participants were the same.  
 
Discussion: Cooperative norms develop within groups 





In this paper, we aimed to study the emergence of cooperative norms over time, following 
group formation. Furthermore, we aimed to compare the processes of group formation and 
cooperation in categorized and non-categorized groups. In the first discussion section, we 
elaborated on the findings from the more traditional approach to data analysis. In the present 
section we focus on findings from the dynamic latent class model, with some additional 
discussion on the experimental method and overall study limitations.  
While our first analysis provided a good description about how cooperation generally 
emerges over time for categorized and non-categorized groups; our second approach, using 
dynamic latent class models, allowed us to study the emergence of particular classes of 
individuals and co-ops, and the types of decision rules that they apply. This second method 
lends itself for modelling inductive processes: we did not explicitly predict or test for 
particular classes of co-ops or individuals but were able to explore the emergence of these 
within the context of this game.  
We found that co-op members, in a given round, were likely to employ one of four 
decision rules – Maximum Cooperation, Nearly-There, Repetition and Reaction – which 
determined the amount contributed to the Public Good. The emergence of some of the 
decision rules used by participants in this study is in line with previous research. For example, 
Repetition, in which players simply repeat what they did the previous round, predicted an 
average contribution within the range of the 40 – 60% contribution often found in one-shot 
PGGs (Ledyard, 1995). This decision rule seems to be a “safe” and common strategy and is 
thus repeated. In addition, the decision rule of Reaction closely mimics what one finds with 
conditional cooperation – i.e., one cooperates when the group does and defects when the 
group does (Axelrod, 1984; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). All four decision rules were 
consistent across both PGGs. The decision rule itself used (a) the particular amount one 
personally contributed to the PG in the previous round and (b) the average level of 





cooperation shown by one’s co-op members. The probability of choosing a given decision 
rule depended on (c) the decision rule one had previously chosen, and (d) the type of 
individual one could be classified as – Committed Cooperator, Responsive Cooperator or 
Reactive Player. These decision rules and the classes of individuals that emerged through 
interaction in the PGG, help to explain the findings from the first set of analyses – cooperation 
emerges over time through interaction with others. As an illustration, Committed Cooperators 
mostly did not start off by hitting the ceiling for cooperation. Their commitment level and 
high contributions developed over time as they established Committed Co-ops together. These 
findings indicate that further progress in understanding how to support cooperation can be 
made by studying the reasons why maximum cooperation emerges, as well as the contexts 
(i.e., the particular types of groups) in which it flourishes.  
One possible key to maximizing cooperation is how a group establishes its shared identity 
and normative patterns of behavior. We found almost perfect overlap between the individual 
and co-op classes, meaning that co-ops consisted of people of the same individual class. We 
interpret this to mean that cooperation depends highly on one’s group and that learning occurs 
within the group. We believe that we can rule out the alternative explanation for this finding 
because it is too improbable that across all 86 co-ops, people with the same preferences for 
cooperation happened to find one another after very limited interaction. Therefore, our finding 
suggests the formation of group norms, which, in turn, influences the kind of cooperator one 
‘becomes’. As additional support for this interpretation, there was also a change in the overall 
relative frequency of individual classes from the first to the second PGG (although the 
participants remained the same), meaning that some participants changed the type of person 
they were classified as. For example, more people were classified as Committed Cooperators 
in the second PGG. Therefore it would seem that people can learn to become more 





cooperative when exposed to cooperative groups and also, that cooperative groups emerge in 
the process of interaction. 
This finding is quite different to traditional research findings in the interdependence 
literature, in which people are usually assumed to have fixed personal preferences for 
cooperation or selfishness (e.g., Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999). In this 
study, we find strong evidence that the type of cooperation that is prevalent in the group as a 
whole determines the type of cooperator one becomes (see also Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). 
Studying Emergent Social Phenomena 
This study shows that individual classes, group norms, and stable co-ops (perhaps with a 
shared social identification) form in tandem, through interaction. We found that within a short 
period of interaction, group members aligned their decision making behavior regarding 
cooperation and, even under the same experimental conditions of the PGG, different types of 
groups emerged. The key question of this study about the emergence of cooperation could not 
be answered without our methodological approach: To study the emergent nature of any 
social behavior (including, but not exclusively, cooperation) it is important to account for 
complex social interdependencies, beyond dyads. In this study, we used the experimental 
platform VIAPPL through which we could monitor interaction over time to follow the 
emergence of cooperation and address issues of causality. While this approach may limit 
external validity, it has the strong advantage of allowing us to study complex emergent 
phenomena in a carefully controlled environment. A potential challenge for research such as 
this, is the interdependent nature of the data – which needs to be accounted for in the 
statistical analysis. With multilevel latent class Markov models, we were able to learn from 
these interdependencies – distilling patterns of behaviors, classes of individuals and classes of 
co-ops. Without this approach, we would not have seen that individual preferences appear 
emergent through interaction with the group and are collectively established in a short period 





of interaction. We imagine many cases in which this type of group analysis could be used to 
study emergent phenomena and will be useful to those interested in group processes research. 
Implications 
In this paper, we were able to clearly distinguish three types of cooperators: Committed, 
Responsive and Reactive. These “cooperators” emerged together in interaction and 
collectively established social norms regarding decision making on cooperation. Recent 
research has also uncovered the existence of Consistent Contributors (Weber & Murnighan, 
2008) and Resilient Cooperators (Mao, Dworkin, Suri, & Watts, 2017), albeit in lower 
numbers than this study, and only making up a minority of their group. Nevertheless, even a 
single Consistent Contributor can change the social norms of cooperation, leading to higher 
contributions by group members (Weber & Murnighan, 2008); and a small minority of 
Resilient Cooperators are able to stabilize unravelling (i.e., prevent progressively earlier 
defection), thus sustaining high levels of cooperation for longer, at personal cost (Mao et al., 
2017). Similarly, we imagine that Maximum Cooperators, could influence Responsive Players 
especially, but Reactive Players too. Future research could determine the optimal ratio of 
these types of cooperators to players who defect regularly, for maximal cooperation to 
emerge. Perhaps introducing clusters of these cooperators can be effective (see Axelrod, 
1984). A challenge here may be that the cooperators in this study emerged together in a short 
period of interaction but we do not know how, as individuals, they might influence a pre-
existing non-cooperative group over time.  
Under what conditions do these cooperators emerge? Maximum Cooperators were slightly 
more common when social categories were salient, suggesting that if social identification is 
activated early on – rather than later, through induction – more of these cooperator types can 
emerge. Further, cooperation-friendly environments (e.g., experiments with a higher marginal 
per capita return) seem to result in the emergence of Consistent Contributors (Weber & 





Murnighan, 2008). Likewise, the cooperation-friendly framing of this experiment (as a 
community game) possibly activated a normative goal frame (Lindenberg, 2015a, 2015b) thus 
supporting the emergence of many Maximum Cooperators. On the other hand, Reactive 
Players, or “rational actors”, may emerge in greater numbers than we found when 
competitiveness is more salient. Future research could further explore conditions under which 
different types of cooperators may emerge; what motivates these types of players under what 
conditions; and how many of them are required to influence others in the group, thus shaping 
norms of cooperative or uncooperative behavior. 
Limitations 
According to the Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation (Postmes, Haslam, et 
al., 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005), social identification with a group is often an interplay 
between deductive and inductive processes. In many natural groups, these processes are quite 
difficult to completely tease apart. In our study, as with natural groups, it was also difficult to 
completely separate these processes in a way that still maintained experimental equivalence 
between conditions. While our pre-assigned categorized groups were signaled through group 
homogeneity (visually, through color) and a history of the group was presented to participants 
(with the story of having arrived from the same country together, an attempt to mimic 
nationality as a categorical identity), there was no actual history and the groups were minimal 
and small. Furthermore, categorized individuals could interact with their entire group and 
choose their own co-ops, which were not always perfectly aligned with their pre-assigned 
categorical groups.  
On the other hand, participants in co-ops in the Non-Categorized condition –  co-ops 
which were indeed small, interactive and heterogeneous – were still faced with the task of 
choosing their co-ops early on in the game, limiting the organic emergence of these groups. In 
addition, the other one or two co-ops could be seen on screen by participants during the game. 





These other groups could have served as comparison outgroups. Therefore, one may argue 
that non-categorized, inductive groups here function as social categories as soon as 
participants select their co-ops. Perhaps this could explain why there was not a large 
difference between conditions in terms of cooperation. However, some differences did still 
emerge (although often marginally significant). For example, the pattern of decline in 
cooperation in the first PGG for non-categorized groups, and the fact that more Reactive co-
ops were likely to form in the Non-Categorized condition and more Committed Co-ops in the 
Categorized condition. So, the manipulation appears to have been effective in tapping into 
different processes. Nevertheless, the small differences between conditions were less 
impressive than the variability between co-ops within conditions. This variability to us seems 
more important in understanding cooperation within groups. In other words, any prior 
categorization effect was overshadowed by the emergent social norms within groups. 
Therefore, the dynamic process of emergent social norms appears more influential than the 
static framing of the group, at least in this experiment.  
Another potential limitation is that we did not incentivize participants according to the 
outcome of the experiment. While this is common practice in psychological experiments, it is 
not the standard economic approach. This may lead to the question whether participants were 
sufficiently motivated to engage in a meaningful way in the experiment: We believe that 
indeed they were motivated. Descriptions of the number of messages sent suggest that 
participants were engaged with one another – allowing for communication over time likely 
made the relational value of interaction more important than self-interest (i.e., maximizing 
tokens). Furthermore, not all co-ops reached the highest levels of cooperation therefore, not 
incentivizing clearly did not have a uniform (positive) effect on the groups. However, it 
would be interesting in future research to see how incentives might change how many 
Committed Co-ops form under different goal frames.   





From this study, we know that interaction over time is important in the development of 
cooperative people and groups; however we have not yet examined what it is about the quality 
of the interaction itself that promotes the emergence of maximally cooperative groups rather 
than reactive groups. Categorization appears to be only a part of the story in fostering 
cooperative groups. Our results seem to suggest that people can change and adapt depending 
on the social context of interaction, and become more cooperative together if they can develop 
the right learning environment as a group. Some groups, however, are more successful than 
others at forming cooperative norms. 
Conclusion 
The results from this study show that collaboration is not a static given, but rather 
cooperation within groups is emergent over time through social interaction. There are large 
differences among groups to the extent in which they can achieve maximum cooperation, and 
while some of this appears to be accounted for by shared category membership, most of it 
emerges through interaction. In that process of emergence, individual types and co-op types 
arise in tandem, shaping (and being shaped by) emergent group norms. The emergent 
properties of the “personality” of the individual cannot be seen independently of the emergent 
properties of group as a whole (in fact there is almost perfect overlap between the two). At the 
end of the day, this means that at least some of the static factors discussed at the start of this 
paper are shaped collectively, through social interactions. 
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Supplementary Information A 
Social Psychological variables  
Table A2  
Correlations among social psychological constructs in the MLM MANOVA 
 Social identification Belonging Entitativity Trust  Satisfaction  
Social identification 1     
Belonging 0.794 1    
Entitativity 0.677 0.518 1   
Trust 0.484 0.365 0.696 1  
Satisfaction 0.586 0.562 0.643 0.518 1 
 
Table A1 





    
 N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. 
    
Social identification 116 5.4 1.1 120 5.6 1.1 
Trust 119 5.9 1.4 120 6.1 1.3 
Entitativity 118 5.9 1.3 120 6.0 1.3 
Perceived personal value 118 4.6 1.1 120 4.8 1.1 
Belongingness 118 5.8 1.2 120 6.1 1.0 
Ingroup bias 118 4.5 1.7 120 4.3 1.6 





Satisfaction with co-op 117 5.9 1.2 119 5.8 1.3 
All entitativity 117 4.6 1.6 119 4.6 1.7 
All social identification 116 4.2 1.3 120 4.2 1.3 
 
Multilevel Growth Model 
Table A3 


















Model  BIC Significance test 
1. Null model  13300  
2. Linear unconditional growth 
model 
13188 2(1) = 120.287, p< 0.001 
3. Quadratic unconditional growth 
model  
13096 2(1) = 99.857, p< 0.001 
4. Quadratic unconditional growth 
model with spline  
13066 2(1) = 37.928, p< 0.001 
5. Quadratic conditional growth 
model with spline 
13062 2(2) = 19.782, p< 0.001 
6. Quadratic conditional growth 
model with spline. Random 
slopes for round in co-op 
12593 2(2) = 484.851, p< 0.001 





Latent Class Markov Model 
Model Selection for First PGG 
Table A4 reports model fit for the model selection procedure, described in the methods 
section. At the lowest level, the optimal number of states (i.e. the decision rules regarding 
cooperation) was found to be four (BIC (N groups) = -93.7). Our decision was based both on 
model improvement as well as on the interpretability of the model. Given that participants 
could give any amount from 0-10, it would be possible to run a model with up to 10 states. 
However, this was not a parsimonious solution and therefore we avoided overfitting the 
model even though the loglikelihood and Bayesian information criterion continued to improve 
above 4 states.  For example, in the model with 5 states, two of those states had a very small 
proportion of individuals in them (0.06 each) and both had a very similar mean amount 
predicted (8 and 8.07 tokens respectively). In addition, one of those states had no predictors in 
the model and therefore it was decided to combine these states by maintaining a 4-state 
model.  
Next, we tested for the optimal number of latent classes at the individual level. 3 
classes of individual fit best (BIC (N groups) = -166.6). Finally, we tested the number of 
classes at the co-op level and again found that 3 classes fit best (BIC (N groups) = -342.8). 
Furthermore, the 3 co-op classes corresponded strongly with the individual classes, suggesting 
similarity in the types of people within co-ops. This gives us a strong indication of learning 
within co-ops as norms form with the group.   
 
  





Table A4  
Model building: First PGG 










1 1- state none -6251.4 5 12525.1 
2 2- state none -1197.3 13 2452.6 
3 3- state none -305.6 23 713.7 
4 4- state none 124.8 35 -93.7 
5 5- state none 546.5 49 -874.8 
6 4- state 2-class L2* 192.8 51 -158.4 
7 4- state 3-class L2 232.5 67 -166.6 
8 4- state 4-class L2 262.4 83 -155.0 
9 4- state 3-class L2 
2-class L3** 
299.8 71 -283.3 
10*** 4- state 3-class L2 
3-class L3 
338.4 75 -342.8 
 
11 4- state 3-class L2 
4-class L3 
342.9 79 -334.1 
 
Note: *L2 refers to Level 2 (individual level) ** L3 refers to Level 3 (co-op level). ***Final 
Model  





Supplementary Information B 
Multilevel Latent Class Markov Model: Technical details of Method 
Broadly speaking, latent class models can classify prototypical behavior of individuals or 
groups of individuals by identifying patterns of associations between observed variables. 
Individuals with the same outcome pattern are considered to be members of the same latent 
class.  Latent class Markov models are a refinement used to analyze longitudinal panel data, 
where class membership is dynamic and therefore classes are called latent states (Paas et al., 
2007). In our case, the latent states represent the decision rules used by participants guiding 
the amounts they contribute to the co-op. The observed data is nested: rounds (time) nested in 
participants, within co-ops, within experimental group (i.e. four levels). The estimated model 
has latent classes at three levels: latent states (which can change over time, therefore are 
related to round/time, Level 1), latent classes of participants (Level 2) and latent classes of co-
ops (Level 3). The experimental group level is not included at the highest level of model. 
First, it is not easily permitted by the software and second, although it is possible to add it, it 
does not result in any improvement in the model nor does it change the results and so is left 
out to facilitate model parsimony.  
Like other multilevel models, the multilevel latent class Markov model is specified by 
defining the models for each of the three levels. For each level, the latent classes at this and at 
higher levels may be used as explanatory variables. This will become clearer in our 
description of the model below. Also see Table B1 for the models at each level.  
At the lowest level, Cooperation/Amount contributed to the Public Good is modelled 
as a linear regression that reflects how the participant’s contribution (dependent variable) 
depends on the information available and on the participant’s latent state (Level 1). The latent 
state of the individual can be regarded as the decision rule that guides the amount contributed 
to the co-op in a particular round. These states are dynamic in nature, meaning that an 





individual can change states (or decision rules) from round to round – this state influences 
how much they cooperate or contribute at each round.  
The latent state is modelled as a Markov chain, which means that the probability 
distribution of the next state may depend on the current state (i.e. what one does in the current 
round is influenced by what one did in the previous round). This probability distribution, and 
likewise the probability distribution of the very first state, also depends on the latent class of 
the individual (Level 2, that is, the type of cooperator or defector that a participant is 
classified as).  
The latent class of the individual defines the second level of the statistical model, and 
classifies individual participants according to shared probability distributions for the latent 
states; in other words, similar decision rules for contributions. While an individual’s latent 
state (decision rule) can change throughout the game (and therefore their level of cooperation 
will change too), their individual class does not change.  
Finally, the probability distribution of the latent classes of the individuals depends on 
the latent classes of their co-ops, the highest level (Level 3). The latent classes of the co-ops 
are classified according to typical features and, like the individual class, they cannot change 
across measurement occasions.  
Table B1  




1 State Previous state  
  Individual Class  
  Previous State*Individual 
Class 
 
2 Individual Class Co-op Class Social Psychological constructs 
3 Co-op Class  Non-Categorized vs Categorized 
condition 
 






Regression Model for Amount Contributed 
Dependent variable  Predictors 
Amount  State 
 Own Lagged Amount 
 Lagged Amount of the Co-op 
 Time Dummy (as control for the first round) 
 
Predictors for cooperation  
As described above, latent states (i.e. the decision rules) are one of the predictors in 
the regression model for Amount contributed. Additional predictors for Amount are 
calculated based on the game data (see Table B2). Own Lagged Amount is the amount 
contributed by an individual in the previous round and the Lagged Amount of the Co-op is the 
average amount contributed by the co-op members in the previous round. Therefore, in this 
model, the history of the game can influence how much an individual will cooperate in the 
present round. Since there is no history at the first round, a time dummy variable indicating 
the first round is included.  
Additional covariates 
 The experimental condition (Categorized versus Non-Categorized) is modelled as a 
covariate at the co-op class level (highest level, Level 3), as it is a higher-order variable that 
participants do not have direct access to, since they are naïve to the experimental 
manipulation. The individual-level predictors, in the form of social psychological variables 
measured post experimentally (i.e., belonging, social identification, entitativity, trust, 
satisfaction with the co-op), are time-invariant covariates and are therefore placed at the 
individual level (Level 2). Since these individual-level predictors were not measured prior to 
the experiment, they may of course causally depend on Cooperation/the Amount contributed 
and therefore are not used for hypothesis testing. Instead they serve an exploratory role, 





helping to distinguish between the types of individuals in the game. As such, these variables 
were used as inactive covariates (i.e., they do not change the regression coefficients of the 
model predicting the decision rules). 
Model Development 
A basic issue for development of latent class models is the determination of the 
number of latent classes.  Model building begins at Level 1, where the number of latent states 
are determined by looking at: 1) model fit (indicated by the Bayesian Information Criterion, 
BIC); 2) the proportion of behaviors classified per state (i.e., there should not be any states 
that occur with a very low frequency); as well as 3) the interpretability of the states. Next, 
latent classes of individuals are added to the model and model fit according to the BIC is 
assessed with every increase in the number of classes tested. Lastly, the number of the 
highest-order level class (i.e. co-op class) is determined in the same manner. Thereafter, the 
covariates at the higher levels (individual and co-op) are added to the final model. For the 
BIC, the number of co-ops is used as the sample size (for a discussion on how to select 
multilevel latent class models see Lukočiene et al., 2010). To avoid confusion in model 
building, predictors are used either in the regression at Level 1, or in one of the models for 
latent states or classes, not for both. 
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Supplementary Information C 
Cooperation in the Second PGG 
The same procedure, as above, was run on the data from the second PGG. The intra-
class correlation indicates that in the second part of the PGG, 15% of the unexplained variation 
lies at the experimental group level, 27% at the co-op level, 6% at the individual level and 52% 
at the round level. The final model was an unconditional quadratic model with random slopes 
for the linear and quadratic term for round included at the co-op level (see Table C1 for model 
selection details).  
Table C1  









The results from the final model show that there is a main effect of condition on 
cooperation ( = -0.93, SE = 0.41) whereby there is slightly more cooperation in the 
Categorized compared to the Non-Categorized condition. For both conditions, cooperation 
decreases over time ( = -0.02, SE = 0.01) as can be seen in Figure C1. However, by looking 
at the mean level contributions, in the second PGG, compared to the first, the overall levels of 
cooperation are higher.  
 
Model  BIC Significance test 
1. Null model  10636  
2. Linear unconditional growth 
model  
10627 2(1) = 16.41, p< 0.001 
3. Quadratic unconditional growth 
model  
10614 2(1) = 20.42, p< 0.001 
4. Quadratic conditional growth 
model  
10632 2(3) = 6.14, p=0.105 
5. Quadratic unconditional growth 
model with random slopes  
10277 2(3) = 377.63, p< 0.001 






Figure C1. Average cooperation over time in the Second PGG 
 
Figure C2. Co-op Cooperation over time in the Second PGG  
 Latent Class Markov Model 
Model Selection for the Second PGG 
 In the second Public Goods game of the experiment co-op membership could change; 
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procedure described for the first PGG (see Table C2). We again found that a model with 4 
latent states/decision rules was the best fit (BIC (N groups) = -4822.7). While model 
improvement could be seen in a 5-state model (BIC (N groups) = -5420.2), the R-squared was 
lower (0.90 vs 0.93) and two of the states were proportionally very small (2% and 4 %). 
Therefore a 4-state model was more parsimonious. Further model building showed that 3 
classes of individuals (BIC (N groups) =-4886.9) and 3 classes of co-ops (BIC (N groups) = -
5006.2) again provided the best fit. Again, there was strong overlap between the individual 
level classes and the co-op classes (between 96 - 99% overlap). Therefore, we ended up with 
the same model as the first PGG but the estimates were different, whereby overall, there were 
higher levels of cooperation and a change in class membership in terms of proportions.  
 
Table C2  
Model Building: Second PGG 










1 1-state none -5229.9 7 10491.2 
2 2- state none 1393.6 17 -2711.1 
3 3- state none 2109.2 29 -4088.6 
4 4- state none 2498.1 43 -4803.7 




none 2489.7 35 -4822.7 
7 4- state 2-class L2* 2551.4 51 -4874.5 
8 4- state 3-class L2 2593.4 67 -4886.9 






9 4- state 4-class L2 2610.6 83 -4849.7 
10 4- state 3-class L2 
2- class L3** 
2649.4 71 -4980.9 
11*** 4- state 3-class L2 
3-class L3 
2670.9 75 -5006.2 
12 4- state 3-class L2 
4-class L3 
2667.5 79 -4981.3 
Note: *** Final model for behavioral data 
 
Cooperation in the Second PGG 
The same model selection procedure as the First PGG model was used here. While the 
final model included the same four decision rules (Level 1), three individual classes (Level 2) 
and three co-op classes (Level 3) as the first PGG, the overall relative frequency changed. 
These patterns show that, overall cooperation increased in the second PGG.  
Level 1: Decision rules for cooperation. The four decision rules remain essentially 
the same as the first PGG, but changed in proportion as well as in terms of the mean amount 
contributed (i.e. the level of cooperation). As with the set of results from the first PGG, the 
decision rules at the initial round of the second game were significantly different from one 
another (2 (3) = 29.41, p <0.001). Furthermore, decision rules had significantly different 
transition probabilities (2 (12) = 227.87, p <0.001). 
For amount contributed, there remains a significant difference between decision rules 
for the effect of own lagged amount/history (2 (3) = 71023.91, p <0.001); however, the co-op 
lagged amount (average co-op amount in the previous round) becomes slightly less 
informative as it becomes marginally significant as a predictor of amount contributed (2 (4) 
= 9.04, p = 0.06); compared to the first PGG. This finding is probably due to the overall high 





levels of amount contributed to the co-ops in the second PGG. Next, we discuss the results of 




Four Decision rules Regression Results: Second PGG 
 Maximum  
Cooperation 
Nearly There Repetition Reaction 
Overall relative frequency 75% 7% 7% 11% 
Mean Amount 10 8.06 8.19 3.23 
Intercept 10 7.488 0 3.588 
First Round 0 -0.716 0 -0.808 
Lagged amount (own) 0 0.024 1 -0.315 
Lagged amount (co-op) 0 0.058 0 0.273 
Residual variance 0.001 0.455 0.011 5.376 
Note: The numbers reported in rows 3-6 are regression coefficients 
 
Table C4  
Transition Probabilities of Decision rules: Second PGG 























0.89 0.04 0.00 0.06 
Nearly- 0.52 0.14 0.16 0.19 






Repetition 0.14 0.12 0.52 0.22 
Reaction 0.29 0.09 0.21 0.39 
 
From the multilevel growth model, reported in the previous section, we can see that 
the mean amount contributed becomes much higher in the second PGG as learning occurs and 
cooperation increases. This is supported by the composition of the decision rules in the second 
PGG. Specifically, Maximum Cooperation (Mamount=10) increases by 20% (from 55% in the 
first PGG to 75% in the second). It remains the most stable of the decision rules with a 90% 
chance of remaining one’s decision-rule in the next round (see Table A11). The tiny residual 
variance remains the same compared to the first PGG.   
While Maximum Cooperation grows in size, Nearly-There (Mamount=8.06) becomes 
much smaller, only being utilized as the decision rule 7% of the time. Furthermore, about half 
of the time, people using Nearly-There are likely to switch to Maximum Cooperation in the 
next round. These two trends indicate that cooperation increases even though co-ops may 
have changed membership somewhat from the first PGG (with, on average, 40% change in 
membership; see results for Co-operative formation and change over time, in the previous 
results section of the main paper). The residual variance increases somewhat compared to the 
first PGG (2 = 0.455). 
 Reaction, as a guiding decision rule, is used less in the second PGG (11%, from 26% 
in the first PGG). The mean amount contributed also becomes smaller (Mamount=3.23) 
compared to the first PGG (Mamount=4.95) and the residual variance increases (
2 = 5.376). 
Inspection of the posterior probability means show that if an individual’s co-op contributed a 
low amount in the previous round (i.e. between 0 - 5.3 tokens) then there was a 27% chance 
of Reaction. This is quite a marked decrease compared the first PGG where one would react 





64% of the time. In addition, one would React 8% of the time when one’s co-op gave a high 
amount (i.e. between 9.3-9.75 tokens) and only 2% of the time when one’s co-op gave the 
maximum amount (i.e. 10 tokens). Therefore, if one’s co-op gave on the lower end of the 
spectrum and, as a co-op, did not engage in Maximum Cooperation, a Reaction state would 
most likely guide an individual’s behavior in the next round. An individual is likely to 
continue using Reaction in the following round with a 40% probability (down from 57% in 
the first PGG) and, furthermore, the chance of flipping to Maximum Cooperation increases 
(29%, compared to 18% in the first PGG).  
Finally, Repetition remains proportionally similar to the first PGG (7% versus 10% in 
first PGG), however, the mean amount contributed is higher in the second game 
(Mamount=8.19) compared to the first game (Mamount=6.88). This decision rule also becomes 
more stable in the second game, with a 52% probability staying the chosen decision rule, 
compared to 27% in the first PGG. In addition, compared to the first game, there is about 12% 


































Repetition Reaction Nearly There Maximum Cooperation





Figure C3. Proportion of individuals using each Decision rule at each round: Second PGG 
 
Figure C3 shows how Maximum Cooperation is a more common decision rule 
compared to the first PGG, only decreasing slightly toward the end of the game. 
 
Level 2: Individual Classes. In the second PGG, as in the first, there are three classes 
of individuals. 60 % of the players are Committed Cooperators (Mamount= 9.66) while 26 % 
are Responsive Players (Mamount= 8.92) and the remaining 14% are Reactive Players (Mamount= 
6.15). The average level of cooperation for each individual class is slightly higher than those 
found in the first PGG, especially for the Reactive Players (First PGG: Mamount=5.99). 
Therefore, overall, we can see that individuals were more cooperative in the second game. In 
terms of the beginning of the second PGG, the three individual classes were significantly 
likely to use different decision rules from one another (2 (6) = 33.29, p <0.001). In addition, 
they also had a significantly different probability of transitioning to another decision rule 
given their present decision rule (2 (24) = 232.62, p <0.001). The key findings are discussed 
below but the full results can be seen in Table C5. 
Committed Cooperators were guided by Maximum Cooperation to give maximally, 
92% of the time. In addition, they had a 97% chance of starting the second game using 
Maximum Cooperation as their decision rule, which is a stark contrast to the 25% in the 
beginning of the first PGG, indicating high levels of carry-over cooperation from the first 
game. In terms of transitioning among decision rules, Committed Cooperators had a 96% 
chance of continuing to be guided by Maximum Cooperation, if they had utilized it in the 
previous round, very similar results to the first game.  
Responsive Players were guided by Maximum Cooperation 67% of the time while 
they also used the strategy of Nearly-There (16%). This pattern accounts for the overall lower 





mean amount for this class compared to Committed Cooperators. In the first round of the 
second game, Responsive Players had a 35% and 28% chance of using of Maximum 
Cooperation and Nearly-There respectively, and in terms of the transitioning among decision 
rules, they had an 80% chance of continuing using Maximum Cooperation if they had done so 
in the previous round. 
In contrast, Reactive Players only employed Maximum Cooperation 18% of the time 
and were much more likely to use Reaction (47%), the decision rule which predicted the 
lowest mean amount. Furthermore, they only had a 9% chance of using the strategy of 
Maximum Cooperation at the start of the second PGG and were much more likely to be 
guided by Reaction (41%). However, in comparison to the first game, Reactive Players 
engaged much more in Maximum Cooperation at the start of the second game (31%). 
Reactive Players, in contrast to Committed Cooperators and Responsive Players, only had a 
32% chance of continuing on with Maximum Cooperation if they had done so in the previous 
round. On the other hand, they were much more likely to transition from Maximum 
Cooperation to Reaction (47%). 
 
Table C5 
 Transition probabilities for Individual Classes in the Second PGG 
  
Starting Decision rule 
 






Committed 0.976 0.02 0.001 0.009 
 
Responsive 0.350 0.284 0.231 0.135 
 
Reactive 0.317 0.094 0.177 0.412 
 
     


























0.96 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Nearly There 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Repetition 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.09 











0.79 0.12 0.00 0.08 
Nearly There 0.62 0.17 0.19 0.02 
Repetition 0.31 0.26 0.33 0.10 








0.32 0.21 0.00 0.47 
Nearly There 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.67 
Repetition 0.09 0.07 0.45 0.38 
Reaction 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.49 
 
Level 3: Co-op Classes. In the second PGG, there were also three classes of co-ops, 
distilled from 88 co-ops which were formed by participants: 59% were Committed Co-ops 
(Mamount= 9.66); 26% of co-ops were Responsive Co-ops (Mamount= 8.92) and the remaining 
15% were Reactive Co-ops (Mamount= 6.27). As in the first game, there was almost perfect 
overlap between the individual and co-op level classes, which again suggests strong norm 
formation during the course of interaction. Specifically, there was a 99% overlap between 





individual and co-op class for Committed and Responsive Co-ops and 96% overlap for the 




Figure C4. Contribution by Co-op Class over time: Second PGG 
 
Our experimental manipulation again served as a covariate at the co-op class level. 
Being in the Categorized or Non-Categorized condition had a marginally significant effect on 
which co-ops tended to emerge (2 (2) = 5.58, p = 0.06). The paired comparisons show that 
that there was a significant difference in the formation of Committed and Reactive Co-ops 
between the conditions (2 (1) = 4.34, p = 0.04); where there were more Committed Co-ops in 
the Categorized condition and more Reactive Co-ops in the Non-Categorized condition. 
Individual level covariates. For the second PGG, we measured social psychological 
variables post-experimentally (see Methods). These variables were then used as inactive 
covariates (i.e., they do not change the regression coefficients of the model predicting the 





decision rules) at the individual level of the model.  Of course, from this model, we can only 
tell if certain social psychological features are descriptively related to the type of class one is 
in, but we cannot determine the direction of causation. Committed Cooperators appear to be 
more likely to experience above average levels of entitativity, belongingness, social 
identification, trust and satisfaction with their co-op. Reactive Players, on the other hand, 
show the opposite pattern, while Responsive Players are likely to experience around average 
to below average levels of these measures. In terms of ingroup bias against the other co-ops in 
the experimental group, Committed Cooperators are likely to experience average levels of 
ingroup bias, while Responsive and Reactive Players below average.  
Table C6 
Breakdown of the probabilities for each social psychological correlate by Individual Class 






Entitativity High  23% 5% 72% 
Mean (5.9) 41% 22% 37% 
Low 28% 37% 35% 
Belongingness High  24% 6% 70% 
Mean (5.9) 26% 18% 56% 
Low 39% 34% 26% 
Social 
Identification 
High  22% 3% 75% 
Mean (5.3) 25% 22% 6% 
Low 34% 24% 43% 
Trust  High  28% 7% 65% 
Mean (5.9) 34% 17% 49% 
Low 36% 36% 28% 
Satisfaction with 
co-op 
High  25% 8% 67% 
Mean (5.8) 31% 14% 55% 
Low 35% 33% 33% 
Ingroup bias High  27% 9% 64% 
Mean (4.5) 25% 0% 75% 
Low 29% 21% 49% 
 
Note: Rows sum to 100%. Each cell percentage indicates the probability that the given type of 
player would score in a certain range on the given measure. To simplify the presentation of 
the results we collapsed the probability above and below the mean of the given measure 
(which is recorded in brackets).  
 
 
